

identified the victims through his investigation and provided information related to the victims to American investigators. *See, e.g.*, Ex. B.

The American military officials who arrived in Nisur Square that day did not collect physical evidence. *See* 8/12/14 (PM) Tr. at 14:5-25:14 (Decareau). The first American effort to collect physical evidence occurred four days later. It was Colonel Karim who supervised the collection of physical evidence from the scene on the day of the incident. 8/6/14 (PM) Tr. at 7:10-8:1, 17:9-18:1 (Sercer). In late October 2007, more than a month after the incident, he turned over to the FBI one green smoke canister, six shell casings, two rifle magazines, five 5.56 mm casings, five M-240B casings, two M-203 grenade casings, one smoke canister spoon and pin, and two smoke canisters. Ex. C at 7. U.S. military personnel in Nisur Square on September 16, 2007 described seeing more than a hundred shell casings in the square. 8/12/14 (PM) at 4:16-5:18 (Decareau). It is unknown what happened to all those shell casings, as Colonel Karim appears not to have turned them over to the FBI.

Colonel Karim and his team met with Iraqi witnesses, wrote their statements, and gave the witnesses information about the investigation. *See, e.g.*, 6/19/14 (PM) Tr. at 5:10-9:19 (Kinani); 6/23/14 (PM) Tr. at 24:8-25:9 (Monem); 6/24/14 (PM) Tr. at 8:25-11:23 (Al-Gharbawi). Colonel Karim also arranged the meetings between Iraqi witnesses and FBI investigators. *See, e.g.*, 6/19/14 (PM) Tr. at 5:16-23 (Kinani); 7/7/14 (AM) Tr. at 46:3-18 (Wisam); 8/6/14 (PM) Tr. at 17:17-20 (Sercer); 8/12/14 (AM) Tr. at 57:6-24 (Zaidi). Before the prior trial, Colonel Karim contacted one of the Iraqi witnesses and told him that if he “told the witnesses to go left they would go left, and if he told them to go right they would go right.” 6/19/14 (PM) Tr. at 15:17-22 (Kinani). His influence over the Iraqi witnesses was so problematic that the FBI had to “admonish him regarding